He will say: You cannot answer question 1 until you answer question 2. More precisely, the particularist response to the Problem of the Criterion is: Particularism Assume an answer to (1) (accept some set of propositions as true) that does not depend on an answer to (2) and use the answer to (1) to answer (2). However, things are worse than this. Rockmore, T. Hegel and Epistemological Constructivism.. Richard Fumerton (2008) points out that there are at least two versions of the Problem of the Criterion. Plausibly, someone can employ a method without having any beliefs about, or even conscious awareness of, the method at all. Reaching this equilibrium state of maximized explanatory coherence of the remaining data is thought to make accepting whatever data remains, whether this includes any of ones initial data or not, reasonable (see coherentism and John Rawls for more on reflective equilibrium). In the late 20. century the Problem of the Criterion played an important role in the work of two philosophers: Roderick Chisholm and Nicholas Rescher. There are a variety of ways that one might attempt to respond to the Problem of the Criterion by using the method of reflective equilibrium. Andrew Cling argues that the Problem of the Criterion does not require skeptical interlocutors at all. A helpful way of understanding explanationist responses is as employing the method of reflective equilibrium to respond to the Problem of the Criterion. The only book-length treatment of the Problem of the Criterion. So, in some respects this way of understanding coherentism may seem superior to the previous version of coherentism. As Chisholm notes, the skeptical response has nothing in itself that makes it better than particularism or methodism. Amico responds by claiming that the skeptical position is not a solution to the problem because that position cannot be justified to the particularist or the methodist.
Without something more than unfounded assumptions there does not seem to be any reason to prefer the skeptics response. Argues that the problem of induction is simply a special case of theProblem of the Criterion. Pretty clearly this sort of methodism will lead to a fairly extreme skepticism. He explains rational doubt as simply being such that withholding belief in a particular answer is the justified doxastic attitude to take. One quickly realizes how troubling the Problem of the Criterion is because it seems that before we can answer the first question we must already have an answer to the second question, but it also seems that before we can answer the second question we must already have an answer to the first question. Additionally, it is possible to have a well-developed theory of the nature of truth without having an answer to either (1) or (2). A final coherentist response is Nicholas Reschers systems-theoretic approach.
The Problem of the Criterion is a significant philosophical problem in its own right. It seems that methodism begs the question too. In other words, Applied Evidentialism does not assume that we will have an answer to (1) or (2) when we reach our end equilibrium state. After all, it could be that our equilibrium state is one in which no method appears to be correct and our best position with respect to each proposition seems to be to suspend judgment concerning its truth. One of the lessons of Cartesian skepticism is that it is implausible to think that we can be absolutely certain about the truth of any proposition about the external world. It is worth briefly noting some of the philosophical problems thought to be closely related to the Problem of the Criterion. The variation in these responses is largely a result of what one includes in the set of data that will form the basis for ones reflection. That is to say, Applied Evidentialism begins with what seems true to us both with respect to propositions about particular items of fact and with respect to criteria for determining when propositions are true.
His response then requires using that answer to develop an explanatory perspective that provides an answer to (2). Admittedly, this does not seem to be much of a criticism, especially since he grants that all three responses make unfounded assumptions. The skeptic simply assumes that there is no independent answer to (1) or (2) and though both the particularist and the methodist deny this assumption, they can only respond by appealing to assumptions of their own. Although Reschers approach is a kind of methodism with a significant explanatory element and one that may make more progress in epistemology than the sort that Chisholm criticizes, it seems to be vulnerable to the same charge of question-begging that Chisholm leveled at other forms of methodismsomething Rescher may accept since he does not believe the Problem of the Criterion can be solved, but it is at best something that one can meet and overcome (1980, 13).
Although the skeptical response may arise in this way, it does not absolve skepticism of begging the question.
Although there are various ways of responding to the Problem of the Criterion, the problem is difficult precisely because it seems that each response comes at a cost. Greco, J. Since Rescher assumes this role for coherence from the outset, his approach seems to be a form of methodism. Sextus presents the Problem of the Criterion as a major issue in the debate between the Academic Skeptics and the Stoics. However, its use of beliefs in the relevant data set seems to beg the question against the skeptic because starting with beliefs about which propositions are true assumes that we can answer and in fact already have an answer to (1). And thus, Applied Evidentialism does not beg the questions that methodism does. Reschers development of this approach takes place over several books (1973a, 1973b, 1977, and 1980). Assuming that the criterion does help us achieve our goal, we have completed the first step in Reschers process. In light of this one might think that extreme skepticism is inevitable.
This work by D.J. Montaigne, M. de. Concerning methodism, Chisholm offers two objections. In responses to Amicos criticisms Chisholm claims that particularism is superior to methodism and skepticism because by being a particularist one can give a reasonable account of knowledge, but one cannot make progress in epistemology by taking a methodist or skeptical approach. Van Cleve, J. Amico, R. P. Reply to Chisholm on the Problem of the Criterion.. The inconsistency among these commitments is present whether or not there are skeptics. Presents and defends his explanatory particularist response to the Problem of the Criterion. Since methodism begins by assuming that some criterion is a correct criterion of truth without providing any epistemic reason to prefer this response to the alternatives, it begs the question against particularism and skepticism. The problem resurfaced in the late 1500s with Michael De Montaignes Apology for Raymond Sebond and it again had a significant influence. Of course, there have been criticisms of the viability of reflective equilibrium as a method of reasoning; however, for current purposes these can be set aside because the ultimate concern here is simply the sort of responses that can be generated by employing reflective equilibrium. Since none of the three positions can justify their position to the others, he claims that the problem is dissolved. For example, Amico claims that the problem of how to square a circle is dissolved as soon as one recognizes that it is impossible to make a circular square. Defends a coherentist response to the Problem of the Criterion. Other Responses to the Problem of the Criterion, The Problem of the Criterions Relation to Other Philosophical Problems, Aikin, S.F. The particularist assumes an answer to (1) that does not epistemically depend on an answer to (2) and uses her answer to (1) to answer (2). Apology for Raymond Sebond. In J. Zeitlin (trans.). After Sextus presentation though, philosophers largely seemed to lose interest in the Problem of the Criterion until the modern period. Argues that both Chisholm and Van Cleve fail to solve the problem. Rather than attempting to solve the Problem of the Criterion, Amico attempts to dissolve it. That is, a methodist might think that the only way to tell whether a proposition is true is for the truth of the proposition to be absolutely certain for her. After all, explanatory particularism assumes an independent answer to (1)revisable or not it is still an answerand then uses that to answer (2). As Chisholm (1973, 14) explains the response: And so we can formulate the position of the skeptic on these matters. Since the skeptical response has nothing more to recommend it in itself than the other responses, there is no more reason to accept the skeptical response because of the problems for particularism and methodism than there is to accept particularism because of the problems with the other responses, or to accept methodism for the same reason. He claims that debunking Bertrand Russells five-minute old universe hypothesis, for example, involves providing a criterion for trusting memory. Van Cleve, J. Also, provides a discussion of Sosas recent work on the Problem of the Criterion. Kevin McCain and William Rowley (2014) argue that methods are analogous to rules in this sense. The extreme skepticism threatened by the Problem of the Criterion itself seems guilty of begging the question. McCain and Rowley further argue that Applied Evidentialism does not beg the question by assuming that reflective equilibrium is the correct criterion or method at the outset. This, he argues, requires satisfactorily responding to the Problem of the Criterion. Several authors argue that it is benign (for example, Braithwaite (1953), Conee (2004), Matheson (2012), Sosa (2009), and Van Cleve (1984)), but others argue that it is vicious circularity (e.g., Cling (2003) and Vogel (2008)). Most would admit that it is important to start our epistemological theorizing in an appropriate way by not taking anything epistemic for granted, if possible. This explanatory perspective yields reflective knowledge and it strengthens our animal knowledge. Puts forward the view that Hegel proposes what is arguably a coherentist response to the Problem of the Criterion. By simply assuming an answer to (1), the particularist begs the question against both the methodists and the skeptics. Second, Chisholm is adamant that in supporting particularism he is not trying to solve the Problem of the Criterion because the problem of the criterion has no solution (1988, 234). Mercier (1884) and his student P. Coffey (1917) again reminded the world of the problem. However, it seems that if one begins with beliefs about which propositions are true and beliefs about the correct criteria for telling which beliefs are true along with the assumption that there is no independent answer to (1) or (2), this version of coherentism will beg the question for reasons similar to why Skepticism begs the question. All three options seem to be on equal footing when it comes to having reason to pick them over their rivals and they all beg the question. Reschers response begins by appealing to pragmatic considerations. Weintraub, R. What Was Humes Contribution to the Problem of Induction?. Argues that many forms of epistemic circularity are viciously circular. Presents a version of the Problem of the Criterion in terms of moral theories and describes his coherentist response to the Problem of the Criterion. Given the very weak argument in support of his preferred view, one might wonder what Chisholm is really up to when he discusses the Problem of the Criterion. So, we face a problem. Thus, Cling contends that arguing that the Problem of the Criterion is constituted by questions that cannot be answered does not dissolve the problem; it brings the problem to light. Another way of understanding this approach is as Michael DePaul (1988 & 2009) depicts it. Additionally, Applied Evidentialism does not seem to beg the question against the skeptic because it refrains from assuming an answer to (1) or (2) at the outset. So, Chisholm thinks that particularism is simply the best of a set of bad optionsthe options are bad because they beg the question; particularism is best because it allows us to make progress in epistemology. Cling, A.D. Posing the Problem of the Criterion.. It then uses these beliefs to attempt to answer both (1) and (2) at the same time (DePaul 1988 & 2009, Cling 1994, and Poston 2011). Rather, they claim that the important point is that Applied Evidentialism does not take the goodness of reflective equilibrium as a starting assumptionperhaps one has the intuition that reflective equilibrium is a good method to employ, perhaps not. DePaul, M. Sosa, Certainty and the Problem of the Criterion.. this answer to (1)) to develop epistemic principles or criteria for truth (i.e. Hegel (1807) presented the problem and, arguably, put forward one of the first coherentist responses to the Problem of the Criterion (Rockmore (2006) and Aikin (2010)). Particularism is not unique in begging the question though. But, this allows for epistemic circularity because it can be the case that the claim that reflective equilibrium is a good method is itself one of the results that is produced in the final equilibrium state. Second, one might think that the skeptical response to the Problem of the Criterion really is better off than particularism or methodism. So, the issue at the heart of the Problem of the Criterion is how to start our epistemological theorizing in the correct way, not how to discover a theory of the nature of truth. In places Sosa seems to go so far as to suggest that the problem of easy knowledge and the Problem of the Criterion are the same problem. This article examines the nature of the Problem and the costs associated with the most promising responses to the Problem. As a solution to the Problem of the Criterion, Chisholms particularism seems to be lacking. When we first consider the questions posed by the Problem of the Criterion Amico claims that we may have rational doubt about how to answer the questions in such a way that that answer can be justified to the skeptic. It will be worth examining each of the responses to the Problem of the Criterion that Chisholm considers and how each begs the question against the others. The coherentist does not simply assume that the criterion of truth is to balance beliefs against criteria and criteria against beliefs. To understand coherentism in this way would simply make it a variety of methodism, and so fail to appreciate the importance of its employment of reflective equilibrium. Although Reschers systems-theoretic approach is complex, the relevant details for the present discussion of the Problem of the Criterion are relatively straightforward. Instead, coherentists recommend balancing beliefs against criteria and criteria against beliefs until they all form a consistent, mutually supporting system. Poston, T. Explanationist Plasticity & The Problem of the Criterion.. For instance, one might be a methodist who assumes the criterion for distinguishing true from false propositions is absolute certainty. Merciers pupil is largely responsible for ushering discussion of the Problem of the Criterion into the 20, Cohen, S. Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.. (B) How are we to decide whether we know? So, Applied Evidentialism does not seem to beg any questions against the skeptical response to the Problem of the Criterion or other kinds of skepticism, such as Cartesian skepticism. However, this desire to start theorizing in the right way coupled with the questions of the Problem of the Criterion does not yield a problemit is merely a desire we have and questions we need to answer. In fact, it is primarily due to the work of Roderick Chisholm that the Problem of the Criterion is discussed by contemporary epistemologists at all. While there are many possible responses to the Problem of the Criterion the focus here will be limited to those that have been defended in the literature. If now we try to reason with them, then, I am afraid, we will be back on the wheel.
Second, he objects that methodism (at least of the empiricist variety that he considers in detail) will lead to skepticism. So, they argue Applied Evidentialism is not a form of methodism. The second major challenge to Amicos view comes from the various responses to the Problem of the Criterion. In fact, Chisholm (1973, 1) claims that the Problem of the Criterion is one of the most important and one of the most difficult of all the problems of philosophy. A popular form of the Problem of the Criterion can be raised by asking two seemingly innocent questions: What do we know? What is the epistemic status of the particularists answer to (1)? They claim that the Problem of the Criterion is closely related to several other perennial problems of philosophy. Fumerton, R. The Problem of the Criterion. In J. Greco (ed.). It too has this result.
In other words, the various versions of the Problem of the Criterion are focused on trying to answer the question how is it possible to theorize in epistemology without taking anything epistemic for granted? (Conee 2004, 17). After all, (i) is a groundless assumption with which the coherentist starts. In fact, the skeptical response is in a sense doubly skeptical. Insofar as one thinks that some of these responses to the Problem of the Criterion provide a solution to the problem, one will rightly be skeptical of Amicos proffered dissolution. After all, Applied Evidentialism suggests that using the method of reflective equilibrium on ones intuitions can provide a response to the Problem of the Criterion.
It is because of this that Robert Amico (1993) argues that Reschers view, though complex, is simply a coherentist version of methodismRescher ultimately assumes that coherence is the appropriate criterion of truth. Rather, these are epistemological questions concerning which propositions we should think are true and what the correct criteria are for determining whether a proposition should be accepted as true or false. Like all problems, Amico claims that the Problem of the Criterion is only a problem for a particular person when its question raises rational doubt for the person.
The Problem of the Criterion is the ancient problem of the wheel or the diallelus. So, one might think the problem for particularism is simply a lack of reasons in support of particularism that advocates of methodism or skepticism would accept. The second step in this process involves showing that a pragmatically successful criterion/method is connected to the truth. According to Bryson Brown (2006), the challenge of responding to skepticism about the past is just a version of the Problem of the Criterion. These explanationist responses share a commitment to explanatory reasoningthey all involve attempting to answer (1) and (2) in a way that yields the most satisfactory explanatory picture. Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle.. Skepticism About the Past and the Problem of the Criterion.. Also, includes a discussion of the kinds of reasons that this problem reveals we can and cannot have.
This is importantly different from the sort of particularism that Chisholm describes because explanatory particularism allows that the beliefs about the truth of particular propositions are revisable whereas particularism as Chisholm describes it does not clearly allow for this. Argues that the problem of easy knowledge is a version of the Problem of the Criterion. Rather, Cling maintains that the difficulty illuminated by the Problem of the Criterion is that anti-skeptics have commitments that seem plausible when considered individually, but they are jointly inconsistent. (See Amico (1993) and Popkin (2003) for further discussion of the historical development of the Problem of the Criterion). The skeptical response to the Problem of the Criterion assumes that both particularism and methodism are mistaken. Sosa also argues that the problem of easy knowledge is closely related to the Problem of the Criterionsomething that Stewart Cohen (2002) and Andrew Cling note as well. Relativists take the Problem of the Criterion to show that it is not possible to provide a justification for choosing one criterion over another. Importantly, the kind of skepticism Moser is discussing here is not the skeptical response to the Problem of the Criterion, but rather the sort of skepticism that grants that we can get started in epistemological theorizing while claiming that ultimately we will end up lacking knowledge in a wide range of cases. After Sextus presentation though, philosophers largely seemed to lose interest in the Problem of the Criterion until the modern period. to answer (2)). Namely, Sosas response, like Mosers, assumes an independent answer to (1).
The Problem of the Criterion is a significant philosophical issue in its own rightif Chisholm is correct, it is one of the most fundamental of all philosophical problems. This explanationist response differs from the previous ways of using reflective equilibrium to respond to the Problem of the Criterion in that it does not start with a set of beliefs.
Further develops the idea that the Problem of the Criterion and the regress argument for skepticism are both species of a more general problem, the paradox of reasons. The particularist cannot offer reasons for particularism beyond the unfounded assumption of a set of particular propositions. The reason for this is that skepticism, as a response to the Problem of the Criterion, is question-begging. Argues against epistemic relativism and offers considerations for thinking that at least some kinds of epistemic circularity are not vicious. In other words, this version of coherentism seems to beg the question against skepticism by assuming that (ii) is false. Despite this and Mosers claim that explanatory particularism does not beg the question against the skeptic, it is not clear that it avoids begging the question against the skeptical response to the Problem of the Criterion. The initial set of propositions and criteria are both continually revised until a state of maximal explanatory coherence is reached. Rather, Applied Evidentialism begins with ones evidence. This is a kind of rule-circularity that occurs when a rule or method is employed to establish that that very rule or method is acceptable. One might think that the question-begging only occurs if the particularist tries to reason with her methodist or skeptical interlocutors. Van Cleve, J. The Problem of the Criterion is the ancient problem of the wheel or the diallelus. Argues against the skeptical response to the Problem of the Criterion in favor of his dissolution of the problem. The fact that Chisholms discussion oscillates between these two versions of the Problem of the Criterion and the fact that he seems to be aware of the two versions of the problem help make it clear that perhaps there is no such thing as the Problem of the Criterion. According to this way of understanding coherentism, the coherentist starts with beliefs about which particular propositions are true and about the correct criteria for telling which beliefs are true, but she does not assume (i). Further, there is some ambiguity in Chisholms own discussions of the Problem of the Criterion as to whether the problem presented by the Problem of the Criterion is the meta-epistemological problem of determining when we have knowledge or the epistemological problem of determining what is true. The methodist response to the Problem of the Criterion is: Methodism Assume an answer to (2) (accept some criterion to be a correct criterion of truth one that successfully discriminates true propositions from false ones) that does not depend on an answer to (1) and use the answer to (2) to answer (1). 
