36 The District argues for the first time on appeal that Instructions 19 and 20, when read together, lessened Ms. Valdez-Zontek's burden of proof.
28 When a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of defamation, the defendant can assert either an absolute or qualified privilege to defend against liability for defamatory statements.
at 591. 40 Failure to object to jury instructions waives objection on appeal. Thus, the statute does not provide immunity for other acts that are not based upon the communications.
55 The issue is whether the court erred in denying the District's request for attorney fees, costs, and liquidated damages under RCW 4.24.510, for what it considers to be a successful defense against Ms. Valdez-Zontek's disparate treatment discrimination claim. View your personalized voting information at VoteWA.gov.
Expressions of opinion are protected by the First Amendment and are not actionable. Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 55, 59 P.3d 611 (2002) (quoting Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wn.App. Mr. Renick testified that Ms. Jagla did not use the words inappropriate relationship. RP at 2432. Copyright 2021 Washington Secretary of State. First, as discussed above, Ms. Jagla and other District officials broadcast non-privileged and provably false statements about the alleged affair to numerous individuals. Ms. Valdez-Zontek was not allowed to explain her position to the board. Ms. Valdez-Zontek explained to Mr. Brophy she had an agreement with Mr. Thaut that she could work extra hours over the summer.
Id. As part of her explanation to the board, Ms. Jagla submitted an inaccurate modified time sheet purporting to bear Ms. Valdez-Zontek's signature in two places.
To make that determination, the jury had to have already found a provably false statement. 3 In early August 2001, Ms. Valdez-Zontek submitted a summer time sheet.
In Corbally, a middle school art teacher sued a school district for defamation after a newspaper published articles about the District's investigation of complaints about sexually explicit drawings and reports of sexual harassment. Copyright 2022, Thomson Reuters. 47 The instruction contains the equivalent of the actual malice requirement (reckless disregard for truth or falsity) but does not repeat the clear and convincing standard. Instruction No. We affirm in all respects. The jury would consider defamation per se unless it had not already found a prima facie case of defamation (a defamatory communication) under Instruction No. If you find that defendant made a communication that was defamation per se, then plaintiff may recover presumed damages, reflecting non-economic loss such as harm to reputation and emotional distress. RP at 2214. at 557. 334, 341-42, 760 P.2d 368 (1988). Id. Patricia VALDEZ-ZONTEK, Respondent and, Cross-Appellant, v. EASTMONT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.
20) informed the jury that reckless disregard must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 123 Wn.2d 93, 108, 864 P.2d 937 (1994). 27 The issue is whether the statements made by District officials about the alleged affair are nonetheless protected by a common interest privilege. at 576.
That is the malice requirement To preserve the issue. RP at 17-18. 736, 973 P.2d 1074 (1999). 34 Here, Instruction No. The District unsuccessfully contended it had proved her lawsuit was in retaliation for the District reporting her time sheets to the state auditor and that the statute protected the District's actions.
In Blair, the suit for sex discrimination was brought against a state entity under chapter 49.60 RCW. The purpose of the statute is to protect citizens who provide information to government agencies by providing a defense for retaliatory lawsuits. E.g., Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 123 Wn.2d 93, 108, 864 P.2d 937 (1994). 83 Ms. Valdez-Zontek's cited case Salvi v. Suffolk County Sheriff's Dep't, 67 Mass.App.Ct.
15 The issue is whether substantial evidence shows any District official made a provably false statement regarding the alleged romantic affair between Ms. Valdez-Zontek and Mr. Thaut.
However, plaintiff is not required to prove actual damages if a communication constitutes defamation per se. A defamatory communication is defamation per se if it injures the plaintiff in her profession or creates the imputation of unchastity to her, and, further, the defendant knew the communication was false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the communication. Her complaint alleged she was targeted by the District because of her gender and national origin and to forward that goal her time sheets were challenged and referred to the auditor. Instructions to which no exceptions are taken become the law of the case. Guijosa, 144 Wn.2d at 917.
at 958, 959; see also Momah v. Bharti, 144 Wn.App. 32 The question becomes whether substantial clear and convincing evidence shows the District abused, and therefore lost, any common interest privilege. She oversaw administration of several state and federally funded school programs. No testimony shows anyone spread sexual affair rumors before the 2001 time sheet issue arose. 13 The case went to the jury on claims of disparate treatment discrimination based upon race or sex in the terms and conditions of employment, and by constructive discharge; retaliation by transfer to a non-administrative position and by constructive discharge; outrage (in the manner the affair rumor was investigated), negligent infliction of emotional distress (as to affair rumor investigation); defamation (as to affair rumor investigation); and invasion of privacy (limited to false light claim).
916, 684 P.2d 739 (1984); Restatement (Second) of Torts 566 (1976)). The court reasoned that it has characterized a discrimination action as a tort.
58 Contrary to the District's argument, Ms. Valdez-Zontek did not allege disparate treatment discrimination based merely on the referral of her time sheets to the auditor. 20 clearly set forth the heightened standards for proving abuse of privilege.
Ms. Jagla alleged to the auditor, Mr. Renick, on November 27, 2001, that Mr. Thaut and Ms. Valdez-Zontek were having an affair, which he took to mean a sexual relationship. This argument also fails. 70 Given the timeline and the court's comment regarding costs in the initial letter ruling, it appears the District raised no challenge to the claim for $9,600 in adverse tax consequences at the April 21 hearing, despite the late Friday afternoon notice. Consistent with this instruction, counsel for Ms. Valdez-Zontek made clear in closing argument that the time sheets were not the issue, but that the case is about why she was singled out. RP at 2661.
37 Focusing on abuse of privilege, it is true that in the context of the time sheet investigation and possible misuse of public funds, the board had good cause to investigate if an inappropriate relationship had resulted in a conflict of interest. Stay up-to-date with FindLaw's newsletter for legal professionals, VALDEZ ZONTEK v. EASTMONT SCHOOL DISTRICT.
60 Substantial evidence and reasonable inferences supported the theory allowed under paragraph four of the instruction. How to vote |
See Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wn.2d 401, 406 n. 2, 693 P.2d 708 (1985); Henningsen v. Worldcom, Inc., 102 Wn.App. at 416-17. 74 RCW 4.56.110 provides in pertinent part: (3) Judgments founded on the tortious conduct of individuals or other entities, whether acting in their personal or representative capacities, shall bear interest from the date of entry at two percentage points above the equivalent coupon issue yield, as published by the board of governors of the federal reserve system, of the average bill rate for twenty-six week treasury bills as determined at the first bill market auction conducted during the calendar month immediately preceding the date of entry. 45 The argument lacks merit.
Moe, 97 Wn.App. 193, 196, 730 P.2d 95 (1986). at 557-58. RP at 17. 54 Moreover, Mr. Renick testified that the alleged sexual affair disclosed to him by Ms. Jagla was beyond the scope of his duties in auditing Ms. Valdez-Zontek's time sheets. Id. | The jury found the District committed defamation per se. Mr. Miller spoke with school principals Dennis Gibson, Bob Busk, and Beverly Baugh about what he termed a possible inappropriate relationship that could present a conflict of interest in the spending of public funds. 57 The point of the first three paragraphs of Instruction No.
113, 122-24, 61 P.3d 368 (2003). The election status column displays whether a candidate appears on the Primary ballot. The statute provides that [i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court in an amount that is to be calculated from the date of the entry of judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment. 28 U.S.C. Postjudgment interest was not at issue in Salvi. Schmalenberg, 87 Wn.App. 63 The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW, allows an offset for additional federal income tax consequences incurred by an employment discrimination plaintiff. Chuong Van Pham v. Seattle City Light, 159 Wn.2d 527, 534, 151 P.3d 976 (2007) (quoting Blaney v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 151 Wn.2d 203, 215-16, 87 P.3d 757 (2004)). 
The trial court correctly rejected the District's claim for an attorney fee, cost, and damage award under RCW 4.24.510. 67 On May 9, Ms. Valdez-Zontek's counsel filed a supplemental declaration in support of the award of fees and costs.
Therefore, textual analysis supported application of the RCW 4.92.110 tortious conduct to the WLAD action. Mr. Thaut told Mr. Gale the rumor was not true.
On the other hand, if you find that plaintiff's sex and/or race was a substantial factor in defendant's decision to request the audit, then you may consider it, along with all other evidence bearing on the question, in deciding the disparate treatment discrimination claim. 16 A defamation plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) falsity, (2) an unprivileged communication, (3) fault, and (4) damages. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974)) (citations omitted); Moe v. Wise, 97 Wn.App.
1961(a) in discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Without deciding, we assume the public figure issue is preserved.
at 414-15. Substantial evidence supports a finding of defamation liability, with or without Ms. Jagla's statement to Mr. Renick.
E.g., Dean v. Mun. The court did not err in considering her a private figure for defamation purposes.
76 The $75,000 in presumed damages for defamation sounds in tort. Other witnesses related having spread the affair rumor or having heard it.
We disagree.
No evidence established the existence of an affair.
Partly due to controversy between Ms. Valdez-Zontek and the District's administration, the District demoted Ms. Valdez-Zontek to a lesser paying nonadministrative position in the spring of 2002. CP at 471. 579, 590-91, 943 P.2d 350 (1997).
This is consistent with the substantial factor standard stated in the jury instruction. State executives | Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 600 (citing Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 92 Wn.2d 956, 960, 603 P.2d 828 (1979)). 48 The issue is whether the District is immune from liability under RCW 4.24.510 for Ms. Jagla's statement to the auditor (Mr. Renick) that Ms. Valdez-Zontek was having an affair with Mr. Thaut. Included for the first time were the invoices for Mr. Crouch's accounting fees.
Mr. Miller spoke with school principals about what Mr. Miller termed a possible inappropriate relationship. RP at 2216. Based upon those discussions, Mr. Miller found no evidence of inappropriate conduct.
The privilege applies when the declarant and the recipient have a common interest in the subject matter of the communication. Moe, 97 Wn.App. 11 Mr. Thaut and Ms. Valdez-Zontek each denied any affair to individuals who broached the subject in 2001 and 2002, and repeated their denials at trial. A Washington statute, RCW 4.24.510, provides that a party, including a government entity, who communicates a complaint or information to any branch or agency of federal, state, or local government is immune from civil liability for claims based upon the communication to the agency regarding any matter reasonably of concern to that agency.. Click here to contact us for media inquiries, and please donate here to support our continued expansion. Ms. Jagla then investigated Ms. Valdez-Zontek's 2000 summer work activities for improper pay under two employment contracts.
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12 was to clarify for the jury that the District was not liable in discrimination for the mere fact of the time sheet referral or the communications made with the referral. Corbally v. Kennewick Sch. 79 As Blair recognized, however, the legislative intent is to consider WLAD discrimination actions as arising from tortious conduct.
U.S. President | The amount was then reduced to 80 percent, or $34,351.89. The degree of fault necessary to make out a prima facie case of defamation depends on if the plaintiff is a private individual or a public figure or official. Ballotpedia provides comprehensive coverage of the 100 largest cities in America by population as well as mayoral, city council, and district attorney election coverage in state capitals outside of the 100 largest cities. The statute protects solely communications of reasonable concern to the agency. See EEOC v. Guardian Pools, Inc., 828 F.2d 1507, 1512-13 (11th Cir.1987); Wirtz v. Kansas Farm Bureau Servs., Inc., 274 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1224 (D.Kan.2003); see also Dye v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 462 F.Supp.2d 845, 858 (W.D.Tenn.2006). The $35,000 in economic damages stems from the WLAD claim. Ballotpedia features 360,880 encyclopedic articles written and curated by our professional staff of editors, writers, and researchers.
The suggested issue of bad faith is then not relevant. 51 The District's arguments are without merit. 73 The issue is whether the court erred in applying a judgment interest rate of 3.69 percent under RCW 4.56.110(3) to recover for the WLAD claims, as opposed to a 12 percent rate under RCW 4.56.110(4). The court explained the legislature did not intend to exempt discrimination actions from the requirements of RCW 4.92.110. 38 After Mr. Thaut denied the affair to Ms. Jagla in the fall of 2001, the facts show abundant instances of rumor perpetuation by District personnel. The unsubstantiated rumor of a sexual affair has no bearing on the manner in which she performed her public duties.
Id.
| The District has not supplied a hearing transcript from which to make a contrary conclusion.
Instead, the District waited until June 2 to raise any challenge to the award of costs for adverse tax consequences and associated accounting fees. The instruction does not pertain to the defamation claim. In 2001, two critical events occurred: (1) the District referred Ms. Valdez-Zontek's summer time sheets to the Washington State Auditor for suspected hours not worked, and (2) the perpetuation of a rumor that Ms. Valdez-Zontek, who is married, was having a romantic affair with the District's school superintendant, Joel Thaut, her immediate supervisor until early 2002.
The court held the pre-claim notice requirement of RCW 4.92.110 for filing an action arising out of tortious conduct applies to WLAD discrimination actions. 75 This appears to be an issue of first impression in Washington, as no case is cited or found that specifically discusses the correct judgment interest rate for recovery on WLAD claims. There, the court upheld a 12 percent prejudgment interest rate for plaintiff's back pay and emotional distress claims. Thus, no manifest error is shown.
22 (defamation per se) for the first time on appeal. Such is the case when ordinary persons hearing the statements would not perceive them to be pure expressions of opinion. But again, the cited passages indicate that Ms. Valdez-Zontek was broadly alleging her gender and race motivated her mistreatment by District officials. Eastmont School District is a school district in Washington.
In essence, we find two pertinent variables: (1) the importance of the position held, and (2) the nexus between that position and the allegedly defamatory information specifically, how closely the defamatory material bears upon fitness for office. Co., 109 Wn.2d 514, 523, 746 P.2d 295 (1987); Story v. Shelter Bay Co., 52 Wn.App. 64 When Ms. Valdez-Zontek moved for an attorney fee and cost award on March 24, 2008, she specifically raised the adverse tax consequence issue, citing the Blaney and Chuong Van Pham cases.
Since the amount of the attorney fee award was still in question, the motion contained no supporting documentation for an adverse tax consequences award. 671, 674, 677, 66 P.3d 1119 (2003) (plaintiff raised WLAD claims and common law sexual discrimination and retaliation claims); Milligan v. Thompson, 90 Wn.App. 56 Post-trial, the District requested an award of costs, attorney fees and a liquidated damages penalty, alleging Ms. Valdez-Zontek's lawsuit violated RCW 4.24.510.
The District contends manifest constitutional error permits our consideration of Instruction No. Dist., 94 Wn.App. General Election candidates will display after the Primary is certified. 18.
F. Attorney Fees and Costs under RCW 4.24.510. According to Mr. Thaut, Ms. Jagla suggested the motive for his approving Ms. Valdez-Zontek's time sheets was the alleged affair; Mr. Thaut denied it. Id. RP at 227-28.
at 957-58.
Further, the parties haven't argued that any particular cost claimed was excessive or unnecessary. CP at 499 (emphasis added). Time sheets for administrators Chris Hall and Dennis Gibson not submitted for audit in 2001 later proved to be miscoded and resulted in funds being misappropriated. at 122-24. The court further found the cost calculations and award were appropriate. CP at 573. State and local courts | 29, 39, 723 P.2d 1195 (1986)). 71 Considering all, we conclude the District fails to show it was not afforded sufficient notice and opportunity to raise challenges to the award of adverse tax consequences, costs, or associated accounting fees. 21, 26-27, 156 P.3d 912 (2007). Id. Click here to contact our editorial staff, and click here to report an error.
Here, the court apparently determined the existence of the common interest privilege was an issue of fact because it instructed the jury that the District had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that any communication was privileged. 35 The burden of proof instruction (No. But no evidence shows anyone had any proof of a sexual affair. Public policy. It was not alleged Ms. Valdez-Zontek engaged in a sexual affair with Mr. Thaut to get him to approve false time sheets.
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